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The analysis of the scenario focuses, as it often does, on rules and institutional facilities, to conclude that access is too broad and that procedural rules are inadequate.
5 Report Justiça em Números ("Justice in Numbers") issued by the National Council of Justice in 2014. Available at www.cnj.jus.br. 6 In Portuguese one would say "enxugar o gelo", meaning to resort endless effort and having meaningless developments. 7 The current Code of Rules of Civil Procedure was issued in 1973 (Rule n. 5.869 of January 11 th 1973). To understand more about the new Code of Procedural Rules, which will become effective on March, 2016, please see Section 5 of this article. 8 As article 8º of the fundamental rules of the Code of Procedural rules state that the application of rules by judges must attend to social purposes and public interest, assuring and promoting human digninity and observing proportionality, reasonability, legality, publicity and efficiency (Art. 8º Ao aplicar o ordenamento jurídico, o juiz atenderá aos fins sociais e às exigências do bem comum, resguardando e promovendo a dignidade da pessoa humana e observando a proporcionalidade, a razoabilidade, a legalidade, a publicidade e a eficiência").
But there might be other ways of looking at this rather complex setting. This essay attempts at different approach to read the Brazilian scenario of litigation and access to justice by reversing the end of the telescope and focusing in the players to better understand the litigation game itself. That means also having in mind the question under what conditions can litigation be redistributive, considering that the litigation scenario in Brazil is occupied by different kinds of parties (repeat players and oneshooters) and that its configuration and actions may deeply effect the way the system works.
Despite the speculative approach to the matter -as Galanter's "Why the 'haves' come out ahead?" piece also proposed 9 -it seems that by changing the ends of the telescope a lot is revealed about how different kinds of parties are able to use, influence and manipulate the way the system works. Such considerations are necessary to think about recent institutional and legal reforms and their effect. Are we addressing issues properly in Brazil? Are we moving towards a more or less redistributive adjudication framework in our courts?
A few notes on the Brazilian procedural and justice systems
The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 guarantees the access to justice as a fundamental right which must fully be granted and secured by the State. The article 5 th , item XXXV states that no case or controversy will be kept away from the Judiciary.
This article is a general protection of individual and collective rights. There are other key principles in the Federal Constitution which are aimed to a fair and adequate adjudication process, such as the due process of law and adversarial principles (art. 5 th item LIV and LV) and, more recently, after the 45 th amendment, the Constitution also sets forth the "reasonable duration of a lawsuit" as a constitutional right.
Furthermore, procedural law is issued by federal legislature and currently codified by the Code of Civil Procedure in effect since 1973. This is the most important body of legislation concerning rules of civil procedure, which is applicable nation-wide. 9 In his paper, GALANTER tried to put forward some conjectures about the way in which the basic architecture of the legal system creates and limits the possibilities of using the system as a means of redistributive (that is, systemically equalizing) change. His question, specifically, is, under what conditions can litigation be redistributive, taking litigation in the broadest sense of the presentation of claims to be decided by courts (or court-like agencies) and the whole penumbra of threats, feints, and so forth, surrounding such presentation (GALANTER, Marc. "Why the haves come out ahead? Speculations on the limits of legal change", Volume 9:1 Law and Society Review, 1974, pp. 95-96) .
Although fundamentally a civil law system, precedents of higher courts are acquiring considerable importance in later years and acquiring binding effects in some circumstances, as item 4 of this essay will better explain. . This system therefore does not recognize the standing of the citizen to file the class action and its main procedural instrument is the "Ação Civil
Pública" (Federal Law n. 7.347 of 1985).
Brazil is a unified jurisdiction system, i.e. claims involving Public
Administration and its agencies may be taken to courts for judicial review. In very general terms, there are state and federal courts, and among the latter there are courts specialized in military, electoral and labor related issues. The state and federal court systems have lower and higher courts and the Supremo Tribunal Federal is the Supreme Court responsible to trial appeals arising from decisions rendered by the higher courts of state, federal and specialized courts and to bring uniformity to the interpretation of constitutional law. In 1988, the Superior Tribunal de Justiça also became part of the justice system and became responsible of trialing appeals also arising from the higher courts at state and federal levels aiming to bring uniformity to the interpretation of federal law, among other attributions. 10 The system nevertheless does not predict effective rules about the interaction between individual and group lawsuits. In Brazil, rights may be assigned to individuals, group of individuals or to the society as a whole. The rights that are assigned to group of individuals and/or to society are considered "collective rights" but, in some circumstances, they can also be postulated in individual cases. This is the case for many claims considered to be repeated litigation claims, such as those arguing consumer rights or social security readjustments.
A TYPOLOGY OF PARTIES IN BRAZIL: Who are the RPs and OSs and how do they play the litigation game?
As recent studies show, a significant portion of the contingent of claims that causes overloading of the justice system derive not from the proliferation of interpersonal conflicts, but from disputes involving certain public and private players, who resort to the courts or are sued by individuals. In that sense, data shows that a significant share of case dockets in Brazil correspond to claims involving the public sector in all three levels. In 2011, the top litigants related to Federal, State and Municipal Sectors, along with the top litigants who are financial institutions, were involved in an overall of 31% of the total of lawsuits that were filed. In 18% these players were plaintiffs, while in 13%, they were defendants.
Drawing from one of the charts used in the article to explain the "taxonomy of litigation by strategic configuration of parties", it is possible to point out some examples of very common cases of repeated litigation in Brazil. . Considering the paradigmatic cases chosen to establish precedent to all similar appeals in which the Federal Public Administration was the appellee, 89% of the appeals were not granted, whereas the in other cases, 52% of the appeals were not granted. Thus, there is a significantly higher rate of paradigmatic cases ruled in favor of the Public Administration, leading to the conclusion that such repeat player enjoys significant advantages in higher courts.
OS vs OS:
In addition to the public player repeat, Brazilian courts are also stage for repeat private players, among which the presence of financial institutions, telephone companies and other service providers is especially striking. These litigants have in common the fact that they develop their activities in areas that are highly regulated by were not able to file individual claims later on, having missed the statute of limitations of twenty years while the collective action was pending.
LAWYERS: how do they influence the litigation setting?
The Brazilian litigation setting has another key feature that must be taken into consideration while discussing repeat players and their influence in institutional and legal reforms. Brazil has currently about 1,300 law schools, which is more than all countries to which such data is publicly known. 
The considerations and data concerning repeat players and their lawyers reveal that such actors enjoy considerable advantages in the justice system, especially in view of its complexity and large-scale proportions.
With regard to the repeat players of the private sector, they are able to finance the structuring of Fordist-like law firms that specialize in the navigation of this system with large-scale, yet simplistic and low quality, case management practices, all of this for very low prices. When involved as the defendant of a lawsuit filed by an oneshooter, not only it has less to lose in the individual case, but it also calculates that the cost of litigation is so low that it is worth it to push individual cases until the higher levels of the jurisdiction, using all appeals available, in order to postpone the execution of the ruling.
Concerning claims filed by these repeat players -especially to collect debts from one-shooters -a similar reasoning is applicable: using courts as a debt collection counter and lawyers as debt collector agencies may be a simple and low cost system.
In terms of bargaining power, studies indicate that by working in intense scale,
Brazilian repeat players adopt what Galanter refers to as the minimax strategy,
especially for proposing settlements in cases where they know that the chance of success in the courts are low
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. While doing so, they dispute the rules of litigation because, unlike the one-shooter, who seek individual and tangible results in every claim, repeat players may maneuver these extremely numerous repeated claims with the goal of obtaining favorable case law precedents in certain issues and settling in cases where chances of success are remote.
To obtain favorable case law precedents, repeat players resort to prestigious lawyers and law firms, who enjoy great proximity to the higher court judges and servants. These lawyers are also renowned and respected jurists, who are able to prepare legal opinions in controversial matters in favor of repeat players, both in matters related to procedural law (as the case above mentioned concerning statute of limitations for collective action) and substantive law. Such opinions exert relevant influence in the formation of precedents in the higher courts, as well as in institutional and legal reforms related to the matters involved.
It is clear that repeat players enjoy advantages not only in the litigation game, as they are able to devise discourses that are influential in changes regarding procedural law and the structure of the Judiciary itself. The dominant discourse that the facilitation 29 GALANTER, Marc. "Why the haves come out ahead? Speculations on the limits of legal change", Volume 9:1 Law and Society Review, 1974, pp.141-144. of access to justice is the villain of the court system crisis is a widespread one 30 , often relating the large and always increasing number of claims to opportunistic behavior on behalf of one-shooters and its lawyers (OSs vs. RPs). Such portrait is widely purported by renowned jurists (who frequently are, as already mentioned, specialized lawyers representing repeat players in important paradigmatic cases) and accepted by public opinion, resulting in a general support to reforms that impose techniques for standardized trials, litigation filters and the search of efficiency at any cost.
Such reforms are not aimed at understanding the real causes of repeated litigation, its implications nor its social impacts. Institutional and rule changes also do not face the fact that different litigations arise from a same common cause (for instance, a widespread bank contract with an abusive clause, a poorly rendered telecom service, the legality of a certain tax practice) and that the best way to deal with such cases is, very often, the collectivization of individual claims. However, one cannot put aside all the pressure exerted by lawyers and corporative interests, who are not interested in institutional changes that will reduce the caseload of individual lawsuits that they legally represent.
INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL CHANGES: How do they affect (and were influenced by) the different players? What are their limits?
As already mentioned, Executive and Legislative branches in Brazil have been discussing legal and institutional reforms, especially after the 1988 Constitution and the establishment of a democratic regime.
The 1988 Brazilian Constitution marked not only the transition from military dictatorship to democracy but also a historical moment of intense social movements and great hopes to attain social and economic development through the construction of a more representative and pluralist order. 34 According to the World Bank famous Document # 319 S concerning judicial reform in Latin America and the Caribbean: "A medida que continúa el proceso de desarrollo económico en América Latina y el Caribe, aumenta la importancia de la reforma judicial. El buen funcionamiento del poder judicial es importante para el desarrollo económico. El propósito de todo poder judicial es ordenar las relaciones sociales y resolver conflictos entre los diversos actores sociales. En la actualidad el poder judicial es incapaz de asegurar una resolución predecible y eficiente de los conflictos que respete los derechos individuales y de propiedad. No puede satisfacer las demandas del sector privado ni las del público en general, especialmente las de los pobres. Dado el actual estado de crisis de los sistemas judiciales de Latinoamérica y el Caribe, el objetivo de los esfuerzos de reforma es la promoción del desarrollo económico. La reforma judicial es parte del proceso de redefinición del estado y su relación con la sociedad; el desarrollo económico no puede continuar sin la efectiva definición, interpretación y ejecución de los derechos de propiedad. Específicamente, la reforma judicial está orientada a aumentar la eficiencia y equidad en la resolución de conflictos, mejorando el acceso a la justicia y la promoción del desarrollo del sector privado". (DAKOLIAS, María. El sector judicial en América Latina y el Caribe. Elementos de reforma.Washington, Banco Mundial, Document # 319 S, 1997, p. 4).
In the original version, issues related to the access to justice guided the judicial reform project, but Constitutional Amendment n. 45 final version followed the efficiency driven agenda, with the focus on reducing the dockets and promoting the economy growth through the predictability of court rulings and speediness of the judicial proceedings
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.This second set of institutional and rule reforms was more focused in dealing with repeated litigation by enhancing the importance of precedent system. Courts are to embrace the role of a manager of pending dockets and efficiency is the main goal, even though this discourse is sometimes subliminal.
The leading reform discourse thus sets aside the concern with the obstacles to a broad and facilitated access to justice and focuses in the search of efficiency and reduction of case congestion. Considering the purpose to reduce case dockets, courts team up with repeat players to devise campaigns and projects fight the overload of case dockets and reducing the time between filing and the final ruling (or settlement) of the case (this occurs, for example, when repeat players are involved in the screening cases submitted to mediation in court-connected programs). As Galanter speculated, repeat player enjoy the advantage of the proximity with institutional incumbents and are therefore more able to influence institutional policies and court practices.
Among the second set of reforms above mentioned, it is also possible to identify that one of the major trends is to import the common law precedent system, but with some adaptations, to establish procedural mechanisms that provide for a more standardized court proceeding and allows the reproduction of court rulings in similar cases and appeals. The main idea is to allow the Supremo Tribunal Federal and the Superior Tribunal de Justiça to suspend all repeated claims appeals and randomly choose one for a the paradigmatic ruling applicable to all pending appeals. This is the mechanism provided for in articles 543-B and 543-C of the Code of Civil Procedure that establish techniques of "sample trialing" for appeals that deal with the interpretation of constitutional and federal law (in cases with few or no factual peculiarities).
However, differently from the common law system, the binding ruling is not based on the facts described in the paradigmatic case. Instead, the interpretation of the law is based only on a normative analysis of the case and legal issues raised by parties. 35 The changes were so many that the author of the Amendment Project, former Congressman Helio Bicudo (PT) said, days after the approval of the Amendment, that he would not like having his name in a project that became so different from the original version, since the judicial reform had been disfigured. According to CUNHA, Luciana Gross; ALMEIDA, Frederico de. Justiça e desenvolvimento econômico na Reforma do Judiciário brasileiro. In TRUBEK, David; SCHAPIRO, Mario (Orgs). Direito e Desenvolvimento: Um Diálogo Entre os Brics. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2012, p. 365.
Also, the ruling of the paradigmatic case is often literally reproduced in the repeated cases, and not used to interpret the factual and legal arguments brought by the parties in the particular case.
This systematic is a key feature of the New Code of Civil Procedure, which will become effective on March, 2016, and predicts the possibility of sample trialing not only appeals that are trialed by the higher courts, but also lawsuits at lower level once a paradigmatic case is chosen and trialed by an appellate state or federal court
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. It is actually an inverted system of case law, by which the precedent is not created from bottom to up, but top down, and afterwards applied to all pending and future claims where the same legal matters are discussed. The party whose case was selected to represent all of others will be listened directly by higher courts, despite his/her conditions to do it properly -quality of his/her allegations, capability of his/her lawyers, affordability to be at lower courts and mainly familiarity to be listen by high court judges, etc. The parties whose cases are suspended at lower courts waiting for the sample ruling will have few or none opportunities to have their allegations analyzed by a judge, even for trying to distinguish their cases from the sample.
The main problem with this procedural rule is that repeat-players are likely to have considerable advantages over one-shooters, given that the result of all lawsuits is determined by one lawsuit chosen randomly by the court. In this paradigmatic case, a repeat player will be able to use all its resources and expertise against a single oneshooter, in a David and Goliath systematic that will most likely benefit the player who is able to influence courts for a favorable ruling that will be reproduced in all repeated cases. As already mentioned, repeat players in Brazil have an easier access to the higher courts and are able to hire very specialized lawyers and jurists to influence the result of the paradigmatic case, especially in a systematic where precedent is established based on a normative analysis.
Another reform trend is to transfer the solution of some disputes to non-official Furthermore, for the sake of taking lawsuits away from the courts, administrative agencies are becoming previous mandatory pathways for those who want to access courts. Demanding that plaintiffs file claims in administrative courts before resorting to courts can be an overturn on the achievements of Brazilian movement for access to justice, especially considering that such agencies tend to rule in favor of the State.
So, despite its first appearance, the institutional and legal reforms that followed the 1988 Federal Constitutional do not express a consistent movement towards access to justice. In the 1980s, most likely due to the socio-political context of democratization, significant changes were aimed at expanding access to a formal system of dispute resolution, with the expansion of small claims courts and the regulation of collective action. In the 1990s, however, though changes were somewhat justified by the aim of providing access, the main goal was to reduce the length and the delay of proceedings.
More recently, the reforms embodied ideas of clearing dockets out of repetitive lawsuits as well as to standardize rulings. It is reasonable to speculate that this latter set of reforms aimed at dealing with repeated litigation will benefit even more the "haves", who already are coming ahead in Brazilian courts. Current Brazilian institutional and legal reforms have been influenced by repeat players and are most likely to accentuate their advantages, especially regarding the possibility to achieve favorable binding rulings in repeated cases.
EMPOWERMENT OF ONE-SHOOTERS AND REDISTRIBUTIVE

IMPACTS OF LITIGATION
As this essay tried to systematize, reforms in the Brazilian justice system of last three decades aimed i) to increase the access to justice, ii) to reduce the length of lawsuits and iii) to provide predictability and legal certainty to judicial decisions.
However, these goals are not at all compatible and the overall trend recent reforms points towards an efficiency approach that does not converge with the goal of substantially expanding access to justice. Although generally considered as an offshoot of the original movement (the term access to justice has always been mentioned at formal announcements of reforms), this latest round actually seeks the opposite of expanding access to justice. Even reforms explicitly intended to diminish the effects of asymmetry may have their best efforts neutralized.
As Galanter previewed, different structural, economic and social conditions may deviate the outcomes of legal reforms. Among the options to minimize effects of asymmetry are the arrangements for the empowerment of OS's litigation capabilities.
Apart from a few minor exceptions, recent reforms barely show any concern the empowerment of the individual and occasional litigation.
A statute created in 1950 granted care-needed people the exemption of legal fees to litigate in Brazilian courts. The rule states that whoever declares that cannot afford judicial such costs is able to litigate without paying filing and appealing fees, as well as expert fees and attorney fees for the wining party. This is a broad and protective access to justice policy that has been broadly used in the last decades also embraced by the Recently, however, a reaction against legal aid seems to be in place. The 2010's reform toward reducing judicial dockets brought up another perspective to the debate about legal aid. Reformists argue that the exemption rule was actually stimulating people to litigate, instead of merely facilitating access the system. There is a strong discourse proclaiming opportunistic and abusive party behavior, especially in claims filed by consumers of social security recipients. Recent case law points out to a tendency of conditioning the exemption of court fees to litigants who are able to prove their lack of conditions to pays these costs. Courts are requiring parties to produce evidence on their poverty, presenting tax and bank documents, evidences of monthly 37 However, recent data about Brazilian small claims courts reveal that lawyers are always assisting parties and pleadings are almost always presented in a written basis. Curiously, there is also a remarkable number of briefs requesting exemption of judicial costs, however they are not charged on these courts anyway, due to a specific legal rule. Also, citizens and small companies are assisted by lawyers when they litigate against other companies more often than when litigating against other citizens. (BRASIL. Perfil do Acesso à Justiça nos Juizados Especiais Cíveis. Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva (coord.) . Brasília: Conselho Nacional de Justiça, 2015 -not yet published) expenditure, among other rather discretionary and authoritarian parameters to define who is poor enough to enjoy the rights provided for in constitutional and federal rule.
It becomes clearer and clearer that accessing courts is a complex and delicate matter that surrounds a political decision concerning who has the priority to use the system and its limited resources.
Studies about small claims courts repeatedly point that notwithstanding its purpose of facilitating access to justice for the individual citizen, is key users (as defendants) are the Public Administration (especially in the Federal Level), large product suppliers and service providers, who are, as already discussed, the top litigants and most important and influential repeat players in Brazil, whose policies affects large number of citizens 38 .
The Brazilian court system is at least in theory equally opened to all, but the reality shows just the opposite, for its institutional structure and rules are being construed in favor of a few and yet very frequent litigants, who benefit from the complexity of the system and the large-scale amount of pending lawsuits and claims.
Ironically, these litigants do not need the system to resolve their disputes, since they can devise other mechanisms (ex.: better debt collection practices in banks or more effective and adequate services in the administrative social security agencies) to solve conflicts with the individuals with whom they relate. Not for other reason that repeat players often resort to arbitration to solve disputes with other repeat players concerning sensitive matters and important commercial contracts.
On the other hand, if repeat players do not make other venues effective and accessible, one-shooters need to resort to the official system when litigating against repeat players and to plead their consumer and social rights against suppliers, service providers and the public administration. This fact ought to be taken into consideration when facing the political question of who should have the priority to access Brazilian courts.
As this essay tried to attest, few litigants are using the system while others are competing more and more with them and with each other for access to justice. Repeat players purport and promote the discourse of court efficiency and legal and institutional 38 Additionally, studies also unveiled the existence of several other disputes competing for the space and resources of the small claims courts, generally too busy with mass litigation involving those large litigants. Under the majority of consumer's rights lawsuits, usually against banks and mass services corporations, there are minor disputes between both citizens and small businesses (BRASIL. Perfil do Acesso à Justiça nos Juizados Especiais Cíveis. Paulo Eduardo Alves da Silva (coord.). Brasília: Conselho Nacional de Justiça, 2015
-not yet published).
reforms that redefine individual access and undermine the possibility of bringing about social changes through court adjudication. Procedural techniques of sample trialing not only benefit the repeat player, but also stress out the understanding that accessing courts does not have to mean having an individual answer to your claim. If the mere application of a standardized ruling rendered in a sample case becomes the general rule of individual access to justice, it will become increasingly harder to reach social transformations through court adjudication, for the impacts of the individual case will be neutralized in behalf of a massive mechanism of decision rendering. Furthermore, is this a legitimate and adequate measure?
Empowering one-shooters could be an alternative to mitigate the advantages of repeat players in the litigation game, however in Brazil this possibility is not satisfactorily achieved. The exemption of court fees which has been regulated ever since the 1950s is being disputed as a cause of abusive and opportunistic use of the justice system, bringing about more strict requirements to accessing adjudication. In terms of procedural mechanisms for bringing social rights to courts, collective action techniques are not able to provide for adequate representation of such rights, while also providing for an inefficient coexistence of individual and collective claims disputing the same matters. While the Brazilian model of collective action has somewhat empowered the one-shooter, it has not established a strong and sufficiently well-construed mechanism in which such litigants are able to overcome the advantages enjoyed by repeat players.
The Brazilian experience also seems to attest that access to justice, as any other social right, faces the challenges of universalization and distributiveness. undermine access to justice to one-shooters, to whom the official justice system may be the only venue to dispute widespread practices adopted by repeat players.
Recent reformist movements are based in an efficiency and managerial ideology which privileges access to the system's already top users and most experienced players.
The final questions arising from this analysis are, therefore, if Brazilian courts, so heavily drained by repeat players, are able to act as qualified institutions to promote social change and the interests of the excluded minorities. Or will such courts be condemned to act merely symbolically as agents of the status quo?
It seems that the answers to questions regarding the redistributive potential of
Brazilian courts lie heavily a redistributive equating of access to these same courts.
